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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a new concept of a market's commodity-information structure (a partition
of the set of real goods that are treated as one commodity for market exchanges) and technologies relat-
ing to it, commodity-information technologies. Using this concept, we can always armatively answer
the market viability problem, concerning the existence of general equilibrium even when information
asymmetry among agents such as adverse selection prevails in the economy. Some Pareto-optimality
problems and policy implications are also discussed.
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1 Introduction
Adverse selection problems (e.g., Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),) have traditionally been
treated through static partial equilibrium arguments. The usual argument is that the price mechanism in
a market with asymmetric information is not sucient to assure the existence of an equilibrium if agents
rationally expect their average receipts. From a general equilibrium theoretic viewpoint, however, partial
equilibrium arguments on market unraveling or the adverse selection problem ignore several important
total-market closed-income-circulation features of an economy. Even in adverse-selection cases, the owners
of high-quality commodities must sell them elsewhere, so their opportunity costs in giving up trading high-
quality goods must be treated endogenously.
Problems such as adverse selection assume that information asymmetry is a structure that depends not
only on individuals but also on their selling and/or buying standpoints. This premise inuences individuals
to change their actions in a way that cannot be described under the traditional general equilibrium
structure. In a recent paper (Urai et al. 2013), the new concept of the commodity-information structure
of a market (a partition of the set of real goods that are treated as one commodity for market exchanges)
is introduced, on which can be based the ordinary static general equilibrium arguments and settings
for analyzing asymmetric information problems such as adverse selection.1 We showed the existence of
equilibria and examples of the non-existence of equilibria, discussed some equilibrium-optimality problems,
and emphasized that the existence of an exogenous upper bound for market-trade amounts is essential for
the existence and optimality of the general equilibrium.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a model that can treat such a market-trade upper bound
endogenously, and to provide one of the most general answers to the market-viability problem by investi-
gating conditions under which market-disappearance never happens, even with information asymmetry.
The key concept used here is commodity-information technology. In this paper, we suppose that each
commodity-information structure has an associated class of technologies that enable each agent (a pos-
sible seller) to supply in certain amounts of their outputs as a unit of market commodity, and that such
a process necessarily uses a positive amount of real goods or services. We emphasize that one should
not view such a technology as an ad hoc or special device for an asymmetric information economy. Even
in the standard setting of general equilibrium theory, it would be interesting (from both an historical
and realistic perspective) to recognize the market as a special place where the available commodity is
completely dierent from the goods and services with which we are familiar. This paper gives a radical
armative answer to the market mechanism even in such cases, that is, whether a situation exists where
all buyers obtain exactly what they expect, (given rational expectations that reect the aggregate real fea-
tures of society), and where the ordinary equilibrium conditions for all agents and the demand-supply are
1 We believe that the approaches of Dubey et al. (2000) and Bisin and Gottardi (1999) are groundbreaking. Our model
might (technically) be classied as a complete static version of their futures-market or probabilistic-dynamics models.
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satised.
If we view the market as a mechanism that is administrated by the government, some parts of the
commodity-information technologies may be treated as policy variables. If we consider the market as an
autonomous system, commodity-information technology may also be considered one of the fundamental
factors behind the market commodity-information structure itself. For general equilibrium arguments, the
commodity-information technology gives a normative and descriptive unied viewpoint of both symmetric
and asymmetric information economies. From this perspective, it is worth noting that market unraveling
under asymmetric information should not be seen as the disappearance or collapse of competitive markets,
but as a discussion of complementary changes and replacements among several individual markets based
on the strong viability of the market mechanism.
2 The Model
Denote the set of real numbers by R, n-dimensional Euclidean space by Rn, the non-negative orthant
of Rn, fx = (xk)nk=1 2 Rnjxk = 0; k = 1; : : : ; ng, by Rn+, and the strictly positive orthant of Rn,
fx = (xk)nk=1 2 Rnjxk > 0; k = 1; : : : ; ng, by Rn++. For each nite set A, we denote by ]A the number of
elements of A.
Market Structure and Commodity Information Structure: There are m types of consumers
and n types of producers indexed by i = 1; : : : ;m and j = m + 1; : : : ;m + n. In this model, ` types of
real goods and services are indexed by k = 1; : : : ; ` and  types of market commodities are indexed by
 = 1; : : : ; . Let L be the set of real commodity indices f1; 2; : : : ; `g, partitioned as L = L1[L2[  [L
where L \ L0 = ; for all  6= 0. This describes a market that cannot distinguish between real
commodities k 2 L and k0 2 L if and only if k and k0 belong to the same L. We assume that L 6= ;
for all  = 1;    ;  and call the partition fL1; : : : ; Lg the market commodity-information structure. (In
our model, agents as sellers may have ner individual information structures than the market, but as
buyers, they must follow the common market commodity-information. Here, we can nd the structure of
the seller-buyer information asymmetry.) For each  = 1; : : : ; , we denote by RL the subspace of R`
containing the elements whose k-th coordinate is 0 if k =2 L. Since we assume that agents can distinguish
all ` kinds of real commodity, we treat both their consumption behavior and production behavior as points
in R` and the market demand and market supply as points in R.
Agents as Buyers and Expectations of Real Receipts: In our setting, commodity  in the
market is really a mixture of ]L kinds of real commodity. We assume that agents as buyers have an
expectation of their real receipts for each of their trade (demand) contracts before choosing their actions.
The expectation for each agent is assumed to be an identity function of the following given aggregate
parameter. For each market commodity , let s > 0 be the aggregate amount contracted to be supplied
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to the market, and let s^ 2 RL+  R`+ be the aggregate amount that is actually supplied. Then, for
each unit of commodity  that is demanded, an average amount s^=s 2 RL+ is delivered, and that
amount will be expected by all members of the economy. (In this sense, we are considering a rational
expectation equilibrium.) To simplify the model, we assume that ks^=sk = 1 and let s = s^=s for
each  = 1; 2; : : : ; .2
Agents as Sellers and Commodity-information Technologies: Given a market commodity-
information structure fL1; : : : ; Lg, each agent must sell their real goods as  types of market commod-
ity. Therefore, they should standardize real goods to sell in the market depending on the commodity-
information structure. We describe such situations by assuming that each agent has a certain kind
of technology for standardizing real goods. For example, the function F : R`+ ! R`+ dened as
F (v1; : : : ; v`) = (v1;    ; v`) may be a candidate for such technologies. An agent having this F can
standardize real goods with no cost. However, in the real-world market economy, no one can standardize
and supply their goods with no cost. Hence, we put some natural restrictions on these standardizing
technologies.
Each agent i = 1; : : : ; n+m has a function Fi : R
`
+ ! R`+ which satises the following conditions:
(C1) Fi is a continuous function.
(C2) Fik is concave function for all k = 1; : : : ; `, where Fik is k-th coordinate of Fi.
(C3) Fik is monotone for all k = 1; : : : ; `.
(C4) Fi(v)  v for all v 2 R`+.
(C5) For each  such that ]L = 2 and for each sequence fvg1=1  R`, if k
P
k2L Fik(v
)k ! 1
as  !1 then there exists some L0 such that j
P
k2L[L0 (v

k   Fik(v))j ! 1 as  !1.
We call Fi for i = 1; : : : ; n +m agent i's commodity-information technology. As we will formalize later,
each agent supplies their goods and services to the market as a vector (
P
k2L1 Fik(v); : : : ;
P
k2L Fik(v))
in R+. Therefore, condition (C5) says that each agent cannot sell their real goods in the market with
commodity-information structure fL1; : : : ; Lg with no cost. Note that (C5) requires such standardizing
costs to exist only if L is not a singleton set. If some L is a singleton, then there is no dierence
between a real good and a market commodity in the corresponding market. Therefore, in such cases, the
argument about standardizing costs reduces to the argument about usual production costs.3 As noted,
condition (C5) allows such arguments.
2 Note that kxk =
P`
i=1
jxij for x = (x1; : : : ; x`) 2 R`. For our results (the existence of equilibrium), the boundedness
of s^=s is sucient.
3 This treatment of a single good market never harms existence of the equilibrium since we can make trade quantities
bounded in such markets without loss of generality. We formally show this in the existence proof.
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Producers' Problems: Producer j = m+1; : : : ;m+n has production technology Yj  R` such that
Yj is closed, Yj is convex, and 0 2 Yj . Given a price p 2  = f(p1; : : : ; p)j p1 = 0; : : : ; p = 0;
P
=1 p =
1g and the expectation of their receipts for each commodity through market s1 2 RL1+ ; : : : ; s 2 RL+ ,
ks1k = 1; : : : ; ksk = 1, producer j chooses a production plan yj = y+j  y j 2 Yj with sales and purchasing
plans zj 2 R and v+j 2 R`+, so that (yj ; zj ; v+j ) solves the maximization problem below: 4
max p  z+j   p  z j (1)
subject to
z+j 5 (
X
k2L1
Fjk(v
+
j ); : : : ;
X
k2L
Fjk(v
+
j )) (2)
v+j + y
 
j = y
+
j + z
 
j1s
1 + z j2s
2 +   + z js; (3)
yj = y
+
j   y j 2 Yj ; (4)
v+j 2 R`+; zj = (zj1; : : : ; zj) 2 R+; zj = z+j   z j : (5)
Consumers' Problems: Consumer i = 1; : : : ;m has an initial endowment !i 2 R`++ of real
commodities and a consumption set Xi  R`. We assume that Xi is a non-empty closed convex subset
bounded from below such that Xi  R`+ for each i. Given a price p 2  and the expectation of their
receipts for each commodity in the market, s = (s1; : : : ; s) 2 Q=1RL+  (R`+), where ksk = 1 for
 = 1; : : : ; , consumer i chooses consumption plan xi with market transaction plans zi and v
+
i , so that
(xi; zi; v
+
i ) solves the following maximization problem:
max ui(xi) (6)
subject to
z+i 5 (
X
k2L1
Fik(v
+
i ); : : : ;
X
k2L
Fik(v
+
i )) (7)
v+i + x
+
i = x
 
i + !i + z
 
i1s
1 + z i2s
2 +   + z is; (8)
p  z i = p  z+i +
nX
j=1
ijj(p; s); (9)
xi 2 Xi; (10)
v+i 2 R`+; zi = (zi1; : : : ; zi`) 2 R+; zi = z+i   z i ; (11)
where ui is a continuous concave utility function of i, j(p; s) is the prot of j under price p and expectation
s = (s)=1 (under the maximization problem (1) { (5)) and ij denotes consumer i's share of the prot
of producer j (a non-negative real number satisfying
Pm
i=1 ij = 1 for each j).
4 The variables x+ and x  always represent x+ = sup fx; 0g and x  = sup f x; 0g. We sometimes use the notation x+
and/or x  without referring to x to emphasize the non-negativity constraint.
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Equilibrium: Denote by E = ((Xi; !i; ui; Fi; (ij)nj=1)mi=1; (Yj ; Fj)m+nj=m+1) the economy we have de-
scribed above. An equilibrium for economy E is ((xi; zi; v+i )mi=1; (yj ; zj ; v+j )m+nj=m+1) 2
Qm
i=1
 
Xi  R 
R`+
Qm+nj=m+1 Yj  R  R`+ and (p; s) 2 Q=1RL+  R+  (R`+) satisfying (1) { (11) and the
market clearing condition (12) with expectation specication (13) for each  2 f1; : : : ; g and k 2 L:
m+nX
i=1
zi = 0; (12)
Pm+n
i=1 Fik(v
+
i )Pm+n
i=1 z
+
i
= sk as long as
m+nX
i=1
z+i > 0: (13)
We use the notation zi = (zi1; : : : ; zi) and s
k for the k-th coordinate of s. Note that we only consider
Eq. (13) when
Pm+n
i=1 z
+
i > 0. Hence, if
Pm+n
i=1 z
+
i = 0, we have no restriction on the expectation
specications.
3 The Existence Theorem
We now state a general-equilibrium existence theorem for economies with asymmetric information:
Theorem1. Economy E = ((Xi; !i; ui; Fi; (ij)m+nj=m+1)mi=1; (Yj ; Fj)m+nj=m+1) has an equilibrium, ((xi ; zi ;
v+i )
m
i=1; (y

j ; z

j ; v
+
j )
m+n
j=m+1; p
; s), if the following conditions are satised:
(Consumers) Each consumer i = 1; : : : ;m has a non-empty closed convex consumption set Xi 
R`+ that is bounded from below with a convex preference induced by a strictly monotone (i.e., x
0 = x,
x0 6= x implies ui(x0) > ui(x)) and continuous utility function ui : Xi ! R+ and a strictly positive
initial endowment !i 2 R`++.
(Producers) For each j = m+ 1; : : : ;m+ n, Yj is a closed convex set containing 0.
(Attainable Set) The attainable set for real state
Pm
i=1Xi \ (
Pm+n
j=m+1 Yj +
Pm
i=1 !i)  R` is
bounded.
(Commodity-information Technologies) Each function Fi : R
`
+ ! R`+; i = 1; : : : ;m+n satises
conditions (C1) { (C5).
There are some diculties with the existence proof. In our setting, we must treat demand and supply
(zi and v
+
i ) as being distinguished from consumption and production (xi and yj), as in the case of
transactions in asset markets, and treat producers or consumers whose actions are restricted not only by
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their technologies or standard budgets but also by their buying and selling constraints. Since transaction
plans zi and v
+
i are not bounded, and the expectation s = (s
)=1 decides the estimation of real receipts,
continuity of demands with respect to prices and expectations may not be warranted in some boundary
cases. However, there is no appropriate reason for limiting such quantities of transactions. In this paper,
we overcome such problems by (C5), which is a natural condition for commodity-information technologies.
Condition (C5) is essential for the result of the theorem. For example, if we take Fi as Fi(v) = (v1; : : : ; v`)
for each agent i = 1; : : : ;m + n, then we can construct non-existence examples.5 Indeed, this form of
Fi(v) satises conditions (C1){(C4) but not (C5).
4 Proof of Theorem
Producers: We denote by  the set of all real-receipt expectations, so that  = fs 2 RL j ksk = 1g
for  = 1; : : : ; . As stated in the previous section, each real technology Yj  R`, j = m+1; : : : ;m+n, is
assumed to be closed and convex, and to contain 0, with Fj satisfying continuity (C1) and concavity (C2).
Hence, we can check that the set of all solutions to the maximization problem (1){(5) under price p 2 
and expectation s = (s)=1 2
Q
=1
, j(p; s)  R` is closed and convex. Now, assume an arbitrarily
large number t > 0 and consider maximization problem (1) subject to (2){(5) with (yj ; v
+
j ; z
+
j ; z
 
j ) 2
[ t; t]`  [0; t]`+2. The maximization problem is restricted to [ t; t]`  [0; t]`+2. We denote by tj(p; s)
the set of solutions to the restricted maximization problem. The non-emptiness, closedness, and convexity
of tj(p; s) are clear. We can also prove that the correspondence 
t
j : 
Q
=1
 ! R2`+2 has a closed
graph. Indeed, the constraint correspondence (p; s) 7! f (yj ; v+j ; z+j ; z j ) j (yj ; v+j ; z+j ; z j ) 2 [ t; t]` 
[0; t]`+2 satises (2){(5) under (p; s) g has a closed graph and is lower semi-continuous, and thus also
continuous. Note that the continuity (C1) and monotonicity (C3) of Fj are used to check this. Hence,
Berge's maximum theorem (cf. Debreu (1959), p. 19, Theorem (4)) is applicable. In this case, it may
simultaneously be conrmed that the prot function of this truncated problem, tj(p; s), is continuous.
Consumers: As in the producer case, the set of all solutions to the maximization problem (6),
subject to (7){(11) under p 2  and s 2 Q=1, i(p; s), is closed and convex. Denote by ti(p; s) the
set of solution trades to maximization problem (6) subject to (7){(11) with (xi; v
+
i ; z
+
i ; z
 
i ) 2 [ t; t]` 
[0; t]`+2, and with each prot j(p; s) in Eq. (9) replaced by 
t
j(p; s), which is the maximized prot
of producers in the truncated maximization problem. We assume that each consumer has a strictly
positive initial endowment, !i 2 R`++. Then it is also possible to verify that the correspondence ti :
Q=1 ! R2`+2 is non-empty closed convex valued and has a closed graph. The non-emptiness,
closedness, and convexity of ti(p; s) are easy to conrm. For the closed graph of 
t
i :  
Q
=1 !
5 See Urai, Yoshimachi, and Shiozawa (2013).
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R2`+2, check that the constraint correspondence (p; s) 7! f (xi; v+i ; z+i ; z i ) j (xi; v+i ; z+i ; z i ) 2 [ t; t]` 
[0; t]`+2 satises (7){(11) under (p; s) g, where j in (9) is replaced by tj , has a closed graph, and is
lower semi-continuous. Then apply Berge's maximum theorem again.
Fixed Points and Limit Arguments: Take a number t > 0 suciently large for the bounded
attainable set to be a subset of the interior of [ t; t]`, and restrict the individual maximization problems
(1)-(5) and (6)-(11) to the set [ t; t]` [0; t]`+2. We have dened correspondences tj and ti to be sets of
solutions (xi; v
+
i ; z
+
i ; z
 
i ) and (yj ; v
+
j ; z
+
j ; z
 
j ) for each maximization problem under (p; s). Consider the
product map  of these correspondences:
 : 
Y
=1
 3 (p; s) 7!
mY
i=1
ti(p; s) 
m+nY
j=m+1
tj(p; s) 
 
[ t; t]`  [0; t]`+2m+n: (14)
The mapping  has a closed graph. Dene a price-expectation manipulation correspondence as follows:
	 : ([0; t]`+2)m+n 3 (v+i ; z+i ; z i )m+ni=1 7! ((zi)m+ni=1 ) ((v+i )m+ni=1 )  
Y
=1
; (15)
where  denotes the price manipulation mapping such that, for each (zi)
m
i=1, ((zi)
m
i=1) assigns a set of
prices fp 2 j 8q 2 ; q Pm+ni=1  zi 5 p Pm+ni=1  zig, and  is the correspondence that assigns the real
mixture ratio of the goods for each market. More precisely, we dene the -th coordinate of  by
((v
+
i )
m+n
i=1 ) =
Pm+n
i=1 prL(Fi(v
+
i ))Pm+n
i=1
 P
k2L Fik(v
+
i )
 ; (16)
as long as
Pm+n
i=1
 P
k2L Fik(v
+
i )
 6= 0, and otherwise by ((vi; wi)m+ni=1 ) = . (We use the notation
prL for the projection onto subspace R
L of R` for each  = 1; : : : ; .) Note that the right hand side of
Eq. (16) is always an element of  when
Pm+n
i=1
 P
k2L Fik(v
+
i )
 6= 0. It is routine to check that  is
a non-empty closed convex valued correspondence with a closed graph and that the correspondence  is
non-empty closed convex valued. It is also easy to check that  has a closed graph since the right hand
side of Eq. (16) is continuous when
Pm+n
i=1
 P
k2L Fik(v
+
i )
 6= 0. Now, the product of the mappings 
and 	,
	 :    Y
=1

  [ t; t]`  [0; t]`+2m+n !    Y
=1

  [ t; t]`  [0; t]`+2m+n; (17)
is a non-empty closed convex valued correspondence with a closed graph. By Kakutani's xed point
theorem,   	 has a xed point  pt; st; (xti; vti ; zti)mi=1; (ytj ; vtj ; ztj)m+nj=m+1 2    Q=1  ([ t; t]` 
[0; t]`+2)m+n. Equation (9) with (1) gives Walras' Law:
8(p; s) 2 
Y
=1
; 8z 2  
mX
i=1
ti(p; s) 
m+nX
j=m+1
tj(p; s); p  z = 0: (18)
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Under the standard argument, this means that, by the denition of , the summation of (zti)
m+n
i=1 must
satisfy q  ( Pm+ni=1 zti) 5 pt  ( Pm+ni=1 zti) = 0 for all q 2 , and so for each  = 1; : : : ; , the -th
coordinates of (zti)
m+n
i=1 , (z
t
i)
m+n
i=1 , must be such that  
Pm+n
i=1 z
t
i 5 0, where  
Pm+n
i=1 z
t
i < 0 if and only
if the price of -th commodity, pt, equals 0.
Considering that each individual maximizes his prot (or utility), condition (2) (or (7)) is satised
with equality. Therefore, it follows that the state
 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1; (y
t
j ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
m+n
j=m+1

satises (12) and
(13). We have that the state
 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1; (y
t
j ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
m+n
j=m+1

satises (2) with equality, (3), (7)
with equality, (8), (12) and (13), and hence it follows that the real state ((xti)
m
i=1; (y
t
j)
m+n
j=m+1) satisesPm
i=1 x
t
i =
Pm+n
j=m+1 y
t
j +
Pm
i=1 !i, or that x
t
i and y
t
j are in the attainable set which is bounded. We call 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1, (y
t
j ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
m+n
j=m+1

a t-equilibrium state.
Since we take t > 0 suciently large for the bounded attainable set to be a subset of the interior of
[ t; t]`, all xti or ytj are interior points of [ t; t]`. Therefore, the t-equilibrium state
 
pt; st; (xti; v
t
i ; z
t
i)
m
i=1,
(ytj ; v
t
j ; z
t
j)
m+n
j=m+1

is not an equilibrium of the original economy E only when (vti ; z
t
i) 2 [0; t]`  [ t; t]
is a boundary point of [0; t]`  [ t; t] for some i = 1; : : : ;m + n. Hence, if (vti ; zti) is bounded for all
i = 1; : : : ; n+m, then an equilibrium of the original economy E exists.
Suppose that (vti ; z
t
i) is not bounded for some i. If L = fkg then sk = 1 and restriction (3) requires
that v+jk   z j = yjk. (The same argument is relevant for consumers.) Therefore, we can also suppose
that (vtik; z
t
k) is bounded for such singleton markets L without loss of generality. This implies that
kPk2L Fik(vt+i )k ! 1 as t!1 for some  2 f1; : : : ; g such that ]L = 2. Note rst that
mX
i=1
  X
k2L[L0
(!ik   xtik)

+
m+nX
j=m+1
  X
k2L[L0
ytik

=
X
k2L[L0
vt+ik   (zt+i + zt+i0) (19)
holds for all i = 1; : : : ;m + n and all ; 0 = 1; : : : ;  by considering conditions (2), (3), (7), (8), (12),
and (C4). Moreover, the right hand side of Eq. (19) equals
P
k2L[L0 v
t+
ik  
P
k2L[L0 Fik(v
t+
i ), since
condition (2) (or (7)) holds with equality. However, if kPk2L Fik(vt+i )k ! 1 as t ! 1 for some
 2 f1; : : : ; g such that ]L = 2, then condition (C5) requires that there exists some L0 such thatP
k2L[L0 v
t+
ik  
P
k2L[L0 Fik(v
t+
i ) ! 1 as t ! 1. This implies that the right-hand side and hence
the left-hand side of Eq. (19) tend to 1 as t!1, contradicting the fact that xti and ytj are bounded.
5 Concluding Remarks
1. In this paper, we concentrate our attention on the case where the average amount of real goods and/or
services is delivered to each buyer. To give an explanation of this averaging process for each commodity,
we use probabilistic arguments including the law of large numbers for cases with daily perishable goods
for consumers during a month, and input commodities for big buyers such as companies.
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Such arguments are plausible when the cost structure (C5) for commodity-information technology is
not essential for small market transaction amounts.
2. Cost condition (C5) may not necessarily mean the existence of total welfare loss under the use of
commodity-information technologies. Indeed, we may assume Fik(v
+
i ) = v
+
ik for each i = 1; : : : ;m+n and
k = 1; : : : ; `, where Fik(v
+
i ) represents the k-th coordinate of value Fi(v
+
i ), as long as jv+ikj is not too big
(e.g., it is in the real attainable set). In this sense, the existence of the equilibrium result in our previous
paper (Urai et al. 2013) may be identied as a special case of the theorem in this paper by dening Fik,
i = 1; : : : ;m+ n and k = 1; : : : ; `, as Fik(v
+
i ) = v
+
ik if v
+
ik 5 b and Fik(v+i ) = b otherwise, for an arbitrary
transaction upper bound b.
3. As we state in the introduction, some parts of the commodity-information structure and technolo-
gies may be considered to be administrated by the government. By regarding commodity-information
structures and/or technologies as policy variables, we can implement some comparative statics analysis.
4. Under the equilibrium in this paper, given the structure of commodity-information technology,
the transaction upper bound is treated endogenously so that we succeed in describing the situation
that \bad money drives out good" as a natural equilibrium situation of the model. It would also be
possible, however, to ask what denes the commodity-information technology. Specically, while we have
treated the market commodity information structure fL1; : : : ; Lg as given, it would be desirable for the
concepts of market equilibrium, market information structure, and commodity-information technologies to
be mutually related and to be treated simultaneously as an equilibrium under a more general framework.
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